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United We Fall: All-or-None Forgetting of Complex Episodic Events
Bárður H. Joensen, M. Gareth Gaskell, and Aidan J. Horner
University of York
Do complex event representations fragment over time, or are they instead forgotten in an all-or-none
manner? For example, if we met a friend in a café and they gave us a present, do we forget the constituent
elements of this event (location, person, and object) independently, or would the whole event be
forgotten? Research suggests that item-based memories are forgotten in a fragmented manner. However,
we do not know how more complex episodic, event-based memories are forgotten. We assessed both
retrieval accuracy and dependency—the statistical association between the retrieval successes of different
elements from the same event—for complex events. Across 4 experiments, we show that retrieval
dependency is found both immediately after learning and following a 12-hr and 1-week delay. Further,
the amount of retrieval dependency after a delay is greater than that predicted by a model of independent
forgetting. This dependency was only seen for coherent “closed-loops,” where all pairwise associations
between locations, people, and objects were encoded. When “open-loops” were learned, where only 2 out
of the 3 possible associations were encoded, no dependency was seen immediately after learning or after
a delay. Finally, we also provide evidence for higher retention rates for closed-loops than for open-loops.
Therefore, closed-loops do not fragment as a function of forgetting and are retained for longer than are
open-loops. Our findings suggest that coherent episodic events are not only retrieved, but also forgotten,
in an all-or-none manner.
Keywords: episodic memory, forgetting, statistical modeling, hippocampus
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How are complex episodic events forgotten? Research on for-
getting has primarily focused on the rate at which it occurs (Ebb-
inghaus, 1913; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996), and whether forgetting
occurs via interference or decay (McGeoch, 1932). However, the
question of how memory traces change as a function of forgetting
has received less attention. For example, are memory traces for-
gotten in an all-or-none, holistic manner, or do they instead frag-
ment over time, such that some aspects of the memory trace are
forgotten more quickly than others?
Early research on forgetting was dominated by a theoretical
debate concerning whether forgetting occurs as a function of
interference; where overlapping memory traces disrupt one an-
other, or decay; where memory traces decay over time (see
Wixted, 2004 for a review of the forgetting literature). Evidence of
greater forgetting of nonsense syllables when participants re-
mained awake, relative to when participants slept, between study
and test were taken as evidence for interference accounts (Jenkins
& Dallenbach, 1924), as decay was thought to lead to equal rates
of forgetting across wake and sleep. As more interfering material
would be encoded in the awake, relative to sleep, condition fol-
lowing learning, the greater rate of forgetting for participants who
remained awake was taken as evidence for retroactive interference.
Further evidence for the interference account was provided by
Underwood (1957). However, Underwood showed that the more
material learned prior to the critical test information, the greater
the subsequent forgetting. Thus, contrary to the Jenkins and Dal-
lenbach (1924) findings, forgetting appeared to occur predomi-
nantly as a function of proactive interference (see Postman, 1971
for a review of the interference literature).
More recently, the idea that forgetting is principally a function
of interference, and proactive interference in particular, has been
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questioned. For example, reviewing much of the traditional psy-
chological literature, Wixted (2004) proposed that forgetting is
predominantly a result of retroactive interference from mental
activity or new memory formation more generally, as opposed to
the specific interference that occurs from learning related/overlap-
ping material. Further, although initially rejected (McGeoch,
1932), the concept of memory decay has also been revived (Frank-
land, Köhler, & Josselyn, 2013; Hardt, Nader, & Nadel, 2013).
This account holds that some forgetting will be due to the deteri-
oration of the biological substrates of the memory trace itself.
Importantly, both proposals draw on our neuroscientific under-
standing of forgetting and the concept of consolidation; where new
memory traces are thought to stabilize over time, becoming less
susceptible to interference and/or decay (see Dudai, Karni, &
Born, 2015 for a review of the consolidation literature).
Despite this resurgent interest in forgetting, relatively little
research has focused on whether mnemonic representations change
as a function of forgetting. Although, dual-process memory mod-
els have proposed different rates of forgetting dependent on the
type of representations (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Reyna & Brain-
erd, 1995) or that different representations are more likely to be
forgotten via decay or interference (Sadeh, Ozubko, Winocur, &
Moscovitch, 2014), here we ask whether mnemonic representa-
tions change as a function of forgetting. Specifically, do mnemonic
representations fragment over time, or are they instead more likely
to be forgotten in an all-or-none manner?
Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, and Oliva (2013) recently used forget-
ting rates to infer the representational structure of item-based
memory traces. They found different forgetting rates for separate
aspects of an object (i.e., color and state). Specifically, the color of
an object was forgotten more rapidly than the state of the object
(i.e., its pose or configuration of parts). The results suggest that
item-based memories fragment over time, with some aspects of the
memory trace being forgotten more rapidly than others. They also
assessed retrieval dependency—the statistical relationship between
retrieval successes for the two aspects associated with the same
object. The presence of dependency has previously been used to
infer the coherence of the underlying mnemonic representation
(Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014). Consistent with previous re-
search (Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Starns & Hicks, 2008), Brady et
al. (2013) saw evidence for dependency after initial encoding, but
importantly dependency decreased over time. This decrease in
dependency is consistent with a fragmentation of the memory trace
as a function of forgetting.
Here, we asked whether more complex event-based memories
also fragment over time. Whereas, item-based memories can be
supported by medial temporal lobe regions outside of the hip-
pocampus, such as the perirhinal cortex (Aggleton & Brown, 1999;
Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007), the hippocampus is critical
to the encoding and retrieval of event-based memories (Cohen &
Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Scoville & Milner,
1957; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997).
Thus, these two types of mnemonic representations rely on distinct
regions of the medial temporal lobe (though see Song, Wixted,
Hopkins, & Squire, 2011; Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & Squire,
2006). This point is critical given the recent proposal that forget-
ting processes may differ between these two regions (Sadeh et al.,
2014). Indeed, recent research has suggested that whereas event-
based memories/recollection, supported by the hippocampus, are
more likely to be forgotten via decay processes; item-based mem-
ories/familiarity, supported by the perirhinal cortex, are more
likely to be forgotten via interference (Sadeh, Ozubko, Winocur, &
Moscovitch, 2016). Given these dissociations, it is possible that
event-based memories do not undergo the same fragmentation
process seen in Brady et al. (2013) but are instead forgotten in a
more all-or-none manner. In contrast to recent evidence showing
simultaneous reductions in overall accuracy and dependency as an
effect of negative valence items at encoding (Bisby, Horner, Bush,
& Burgess, 2018), a lack of a decrease in dependency, despite
reductions in accuracy, would be consistent with evidence showing
retained dependency for source features associated with words
despite decreases in overall accuracy as a function of dual task
load (Boywitt & Meiser, 2013).
We have previously shown that the encoding of overlapping
pairwise associations can result in retrieval dependency (Horner
& Burgess, 2014). For example, if a participant learns associ-
ations between kitchen and hammer, kitchen and Barack
Obama, and hammer and Barack Obama across three separate
encoding trials, retrieval dependency is seen for all constituent
elements of this separately encoded ‘event.’ If you are cued
with kitchen and successfully retrieve Barack Obama, you are
more likely to also successfully retrieve hammer when cued
with kitchen on a separate retrieval trial. This dependency is
similar to that seen when all three elements are encoded on a
single trial (Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014), suggesting that
encoding all three pairwise associations forms a coherent event
engram similar in nature to that formed in a single spatiotem-
poral context. We have also provided fMRI evidence that these
elements are bound into coherent event engrams in the hip-
pocampus, allowing for the subsequent retrieval of all event
elements (Horner, Bisby, Bush, Lin, & Burgess, 2015). The
retrieval of all event elements is consistent with the idea that
recollection (as opposed to familiarity) is associated with all-
or-none, or holistic, retrieval (Yonelinas, 1994), and provides
evidence for all-or-none retrieval occurring via pattern comple-
tion; the complete retrieval of a representation (i.e., pattern) in
the presence of a partial or ambiguous cue (Gardner-Medwin,
1976; Hopfield, 1982; Marr, 1971; McClelland, McNaughton,
& O’Reilly, 1995; Treves & Rolls, 1992; for reviews, see
Horner & Doeller, 2017; Hunsaker & Kesner, 2013). Consistent
with this, Meiser, Sattler, & Weisser (2008) showed that de-
pendency for source details (i.e., location and size), associated
with words, is observed when participants report subjective
experiences of recollection, but not when reporting feelings of
familiarity.
Here, we define forgetting as decreases in accuracy between
retrieval time points, and remain theoretically agnostic as to
whether forgetting is a result of decreased accessibility for
intact memory traces, or a loss of the underlying trace itself
(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Although any measure of forget-
ting will inevitably be derived from differences in the propor-
tion of memories retained between two retrieval time points,
here we ask, as these coherent events are forgotten (as measure
by retrieval accuracy), do we see decreases in retrieval depen-
dency? This would imply that the underlying memory traces are
fragmenting over time (see Figure 1C). However, if forgetting
occurs, but dependency is consistent over time, then this would
imply that coherent event-based memories are instead forgotten
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in an all-or-none manner (see Figure 1B), with event-based
memories being more likely to be either retained or forgotten in
their entirety.
We used a design similar to that developed by (Horner &
Burgess, 2014). Across all four experiments, at encoding, par-
ticipants learned a series of multielement events (see Figure 2).
Each event consisted of three elements (locations, famous peo-
ple and objects). Events were ‘built up’ over two/three separate,
spaced, encoding trials. Each trial consisted of the presentation
of one of the three possible pairwise associations from an event.
This allows us to build events with different structures of
overlapping pairs: closed-loops, where all the pairwise associ-
ations are encoded (e.g., kitchen–hammer, kitchen–Barack
Obama, hammer–Barack Obama) or open-loops, where only
two out of the three possible pairwise associations are encoded
(e.g., kitchen–hammer, kitchen–Barack Obama).
We have previously shown that dependency is seen for
closed-loops (and three element events learned on a single
encoding trial), but not for open-loops (Horner et al., 2015;
Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014). The associative structure
formed for closed-loops is therefore similar in nature to a
coherent event engram formed in a single encoding trial. Given
these findings, we refer to closed-loop associative structures as
“events” but note that they are not single spatiotemporal events
as typically defined. Dependency is not seen for open-loops
and, as such, the open-loop condition serves as a control con-
dition where dependency is not expected, even when retrieval
shortly follows encoding. The inclusion of the open-loop con-
dition also allowed us to assess the further possibility that
overlapping associations may undergo a process of integration
over time, such that open-loops might show dependency after a
delay. This is in light of research showing that the ability to
infer the relationship between nonencoded B–C pairs (after
encoding A–B and A–C pairs) increases following a short nap
(Lau, Tucker, & Fishbein, 2010). Thus, sleep may play a role in
generalizing across related, but independently encoded, infor-
mation (Ellenbogen, Hu, Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007; Wag-
ner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, & Born, 2004), as is the case for
open-loops.
At immediate and delayed retrieval, we tested the encoded
associations from half of the events in both directions (e.g., cue
location, retrieve the associated person; cue person, retrieve the
associated location) using cued six-alternative forced choice. In
Experiment 1, we tested immediately and following a delay of
12 hr. Forgetting was presumed to have occurred after 12 hr
relative to the immediate condition. Given the well-established
finding that sleep decreases forgetting (see Diekelmann &
Born, 2010 for a review), we also manipulated the extent of
forgetting by training in the morning or evening, such that half
the participants were awake between study and test and half
were asleep. The sleep manipulation also allowed us to assess
whether sleep played a role in integrating pairwise associations
encoded as open-loops (e.g., Lau et al., 2010).
Experiment 1 showed clear evidence for retained retrieval
dependency in the closed-loop condition after a 12-hr delay,
even in the awake condition where forgetting was high. Given
the dependency seen for closed-loops, we further assessed
dependency following a week (in Experiment 2 through 4).
Across all four experiments, we see variable rates of forgetting,
but no evidence for a change in dependency for closed-loops (or
open-loops). A lack of a decrease in dependency for closed-
loops, despite a decrease in overall memory performance,
shows that closed-loops retain their dependency after forgetting
has occurred, implying that forgetting is more likely to occur in
an all-on-none manner with closed-loops being either retained
or forgotten in their entirety.
Figure 1. Illustration of retrieval accuracy and dependency for three-element events immediately after
encoding and after all-or-none or independent forgetting has occurred. Panel A: After encoding. We assume that
some events are either not encoded or are forgotten between encoding and immediate test (represented by
transparent events). Retrieval is all-or-none for remembered events. All-or-none retrieval is reflected in values
of dependency significantly greater than 0. Panel B: After all-or-none forgetting. Events are forgotten in an
all-or-none manner. Despite decreases in retrieval accuracy, due to forgetting, dependency does not decrease
relative to dependency in Panel A. Panel C: After independent forgetting. Individual associations are remem-
bered and/or forgotten within the same event. Dependency decreases relative to dependency in Panel A, despite
the same decrease in accuracy as in Panel B. Associative structures illustrate three-element events.
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Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assessed retrieval accuracy and dependency im-
mediately after encoding and after a 12-hr delay. We manipulated
the time of encoding, such that half the participants encoded
pairwise associations in the morning and half encoded in the
evening. This meant that half the participants slept between study
and test (sleep condition), and half were awake between study and
test (awake condition). The inclusion of a sleep manipulation was
twofold: (1) to vary the amount of forgetting while controlling
for the interval between initial learning and subsequent testing and
(2) to assess whether sleep plays a role in the integration of two
overlapping pairwise associations (i.e., open-loops).
Lau et al. (2010) found that when participants learned over-
lapping A–B and A–C pairs (i.e., open-loops), their ability to
infer a relationship between B and C increased following a nap,
relative to an awake condition. However, B–C inference can
potentially occur via two means: (1) encoding generalization,
where prior to retrieval, A–B and A–C associations are inte-
grated into a generalized representation that potentially forms a
direct association between B and C (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008;
Zeithamova, Dominick, & Preston, 2012) or (2) retrieval gen-
eralization, where the relationship between B and C is inferred
“on-the-fly” at the point of retrieval (Banino, Koster, Hassabis,
& Kumaran, 2016; Kumaran & McClelland, 2012). Assessing
retrieval accuracy and dependency for open-loops allows us to
differentiate between these two possibilities, under the assump-
tion that if A–B and A–C pairs are integrated prior to retrieval,
behavioral dependency will be seen. Thus, if we see increases
in B–C inference as a function of sleep, with an associated
increase in dependency, this would support encoding (or non-
retrieval) based generalization. If B–C inference increases with-
out any increase in dependency, this would support retrieval-
based generalization. In the latter case, sleep might increase the
associative strength of the directly encoded A–B and A–C pairs,
and this might subsequently increase the probability of B–C
inference at retrieval.
Figure 2. General experimental design. Panels A and B: Encoding. Participants saw multiple pairwise
associations. They imagined each association interaction in “a meaningful way as vividly as possible” for 6 s.
Each association was preceded by a 500-ms fixation cross and followed by a 500-ms blank screen (Panel A)
Experiments 1 and 2. Participants encoded two or three overlapping pairwise associations depending on whether
they were allocated to the between-subjects open- versus closed-loop conditions, respectively. In the open-loop
condition, participants did not encode the third and final association (e.g., hammer–Obama and wallet–Beckham;
see Panel E). Panel B: Experiments 3 and 4. Participants encoded open- and closed-loop pairwise associations
in an intermixed manner. Solid and dotted lines were not presented but highlight closed- (solid lines) and
open-loops (dotted lines). Panel C: Test. Participants were presented with a single cue and required to retrieve
one of the other elements from the same event from among five foils (elements of the same type from other
events) in 6 s. Each cued-recognition trial was preceded by a 500-ms fixation cross and followed by a 500-ms
blank screen. Panel D: The associative structure of closed-loops with example encoding order for three pairwise
associations (numbers 1 through 3). Panel D: The associative structure of open-loops with example encoding
order for the two pairwise associations (numbers 1 and 2). The third and final associations (i.e., person-object
in this example) is not shown to the participants.
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Open-loops served as a control condition for closed-loops in
relation to assessing forgetting of coherent (closed-loop) event-
based memories. However, given evidence for the possible inte-
gration of open-loops as a result of sleep (Lau et al., 2010), we also
focused on potential increases in dependency in the open-loop
condition. In short, Experiment 1 asked (1) whether dependency
for closed-loops decreases over time (in relation to our core
question of whether coherent events fragment as a function of
forgetting) and (2) whether dependency for open-loops increases
over time (in relation to whether overlapping associations are
integrated as a function of sleep).
Method
Participants. From previous published work (Horner et al.,
2015; Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014), with N  177, we calcu-
lated an effect size of d  .62 on our ability to detect a significant
difference between the proportion of joint retrieval in the data and
independent model (see the following Modeling retrieval depen-
dency section). Using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, &
Lang, 2009), we conducted a power analysis with d  .62 and 
.05 and computed that we required a sample size of 26 to detect a
significant effect, if one is present, with a power of .85.
One hundred four participants (26 participants per condition,
across four between-subjects conditions) gave informed consent to
participate in Experiment 1. Participants were recruited from the
University of York student population and took part in exchange
for course credit or monetary compensation. Participants took part
in one of four conditions: 26 participants in the open-loop, awake
condition (23 female, M age  19.88 years, age range  18–28
years), 26 in the open-loop, sleep condition (19 female, M age 
19.68, age range  18–23 years), 26 in the closed-loop, awake
condition (23 female, M age  20.15 years, age range  18–25),
and 26 in the closed-loop, sleep condition (20 female, M age 
20.65, age range  18–28 years). All studies were approved by the
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, University of York.
Materials. The stimuli consisted of 60 locations (e.g.,
kitchen), 60 famous people (e.g., Barack Obama), and 60 common
objects (e.g., hammer; available at http://osf.io/k495x/). From
these, 60 randomized location-person-object triplets were gener-
ated for each participant. Note, we use triplet to refer to the three
elements (location, person and object) that were assigned to the
same associative structure (closed- or open-loop). Triplets were
randomly assigned across the experimental conditions open- ver-
sus closed-loops. For closed-loops, all three possible pairwise
associations for a given triplet were encoded. For open-loops only
two out of the three pairwise associations were encoded. Triplets
were never presented all together at study or test. Only specific
pairwise associations were encoded and retrieved for each triplet,
dependent on whether they were open- or closed-loops. Triplets
were randomly assigned to the within-subject experimental condi-
tions tested (i.e., tested at Time 1 [T1]) versus not-tested (i.e., not
tested at T1; results are reported in the online supplemental ma-
terial).
Note, the open-loop condition is equated to the closed-loop
condition in the number of elements, but not in terms of the
number of associations. We have previously shown that a lack of
dependency for open-loops is seen when three overlapping asso-
ciations are encoded in an associative chain (e.g., kitchen–hammer,
kitchen–Barack Obama, Barack Obama–dog), controlling for the
number of associations (but not the number of elements) between
open- and closed-loops (Horner & Burgess, 2014). Any differ-
ences in dependency between the two conditions in the current
experiments are therefore unlikely to be driven by differences in
the number of associations. Although we control for the exposure
to each pairwise association across open- and closed-loops, two of
the individual elements in the open-loop condition are only pre-
sented once, whereas all elements are presented twice in the
closed-loop condition. Controlling for exposure to each element
would require repetition of pairwise associations in the open-loop
condition. We prefer to control for the number of exposures to
each pairwise association, given this is what is being tested at
retrieval, rather than the number of exposures to each individual
element. The open- and closed-loop structures are similar in nature
to the structures encoded to induce the fan effect, where RTs
increase and accuracy decreases in a cued recall task as the number
of elements (e.g., locations) associated with one element (e.g.,
person) is increased (Anderson, 1974). However, here we used
event-unique locations, people, and objects for both the closed-
and open-loop structures, minimizing the likelihood of inducing a
fan effect.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of a single encoding
session and two test sessions. Self-report ratings of alertness were
collected before encoding and the second test session using the
Stanford Sleepiness Scale (results reported in the online supple-
mental material). Session 1 (T1) took place between approximately
8 a.m. and 9 a.m. for participants in the awake condition (open-
loop: M  8:31 a.m., range  7:57–9:19 a.m.; closed-loop: M 
8:46 a.m., range  8:04–9:31 a.m.) and approximately 8–9 p.m.
for participants in the sleep condition (open-loop: M  8:52 p.m.,
range  8:05–9:34 p.m.; closed-loop: M  8:48 p.m., range 
7:48–9:34 p.m.). T1 consisted of a single study phase, and a test
phase (see details to follow). Participants in the awake conditions
spent the remainder of the day normally and returned approxi-
mately 12 hr later for session 2 (Time 2 [T2]; open-loop: M  11
hr, 50 min, range  11 hr, 40 min–12 hr, 7 min; closed-loop: M 
11 hr, 49 min, range  11 hr, 28 min–12 hr, 3 min) at approxi-
mately 8 to 9 p.m. Participants in the post-encoding sleep condi-
tion returned to their own residence, slept overnight, and returned
approximately 12 hr later (open-loop: M  11 hr, 51 min, range 
11 hr, 23 min–12 hr, 16 min; closed-loop: M  11 hr, 53 min,
range  11 hr, 44 min–12 hr, 13 min) at approximately 8 to 9 a.m.
A 2  2 (Loop  Sleep) between-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with the factors Loop referring to whether participants
encoded open- or closed-loops and Sleep referring to whether
encoding was followed by sleep or wakefulness, revealed no
significant difference in the duration of the interval between T1
and T2 across conditions (Fs  2.00, ps  .16).
Participants in the sleep condition completed a sleep diary prior
to T1 and T2. Self-reported sleep durations were not collected
from three participants in the open-loop condition and one partic-
ipant in the closed-loop condition. Sleep quality ratings were not
collected from three participants in the open- and closed-loop
condition, respectively. We found no differences in self-reported
duration, t(46)  .22, p  .83, d  .06, or quality, t(44)  .54, p 
.59, d  .16, of sleep between T1 and T2 for participants in the
open versus closed-loop sleep conditions.
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Encoding (T1). During encoding, participants were presented
with specific pairwise associations for each of the 60 triplets.
Participants learned one pairwise association per trial. All pairwise
associations were presented on a computer screen as words, with
one item to the left and one to the right of fixation. The left/right
assignment was randomly chosen on each trial. The words re-
mained on screen for 6 s. Participants were instructed to imagine,
as vividly as possible, the items interacting in a meaningful way
for the full 6 s. For example, when presented with the words
Barack Obama and hammer, they might imagine Obama acci-
dently hitting his thumb with a hammer. Each word-pair presen-
tation was preceded by a 500-ms fixation cross and followed by a
500-ms blank screen. In the open-loop condition, participants
learned, for each triplet, two (out of the three possible) pairwise
associations, making a total of 120 encoding trials. For each triplet
in the closed-loop condition, participants learned all three pairwise
associations, making a total of 180 encoding trials.
The encoding phase consisted of two or three blocks, for the
open- and closed-loops respectively, of 60 trials with one pair from
each triplet being presented during each block (participants were
not made aware of this structure). A break of 20 s would follow
every 30 encoding trials. Within each block, the order of presen-
tation was randomized. Each open-loop consisted of a common
item (e.g., if the participants learned location-person and then
location-object, location would be the common item). Twenty
triplets were randomly assigned to each of the three possible
common items (i.e., locations, people or objects). The presentation
order for open-loops across the two blocks was (1) person-
location, location-object; (2) location-object, object-person; (3)
object-person, person-location. Closed-loops were randomly ro-
tated in the same manner. The presentation order for the closed-
loops across the three encoding blocks was: (1) person-location,
location-object, object-person; (2) location-object, object-person,
person-location; (3) object-person, person-location, location-
object.
Test (T1 and T2). During the test sessions, participants per-
formed a forced-choice cued-recognition task. On a given trial, the
cue and six possible targets were presented simultaneously on
screen. The cue was presented in the middle of the screen with six
possible targets; one target and five foils from the same category
(e.g., if the target word was hammer, the five foils would be other
randomly selected objects from other triplets), in two rows of three
below the cue. Participants had 6 s to respond with a key press and
were instructed to be as accurate as possible in the time given. The
location of the correct target item was randomly selected on each
retrieval trial. Missing responses (M  .05, SD  .07) were
counted as incorrect trials for both the accuracy and dependency
analyses. A 2  2 (Loop  Sleep) between-subjects ANOVA,
where the dependent variable was the proportion of nonresponses
(collapsed across T1 and T2), showed no significant effects (Fs 
2.5, ps  .11). Thus, any differences in dependency across con-
ditions are unlikely to be caused by assuming nonresponses would
have been incorrect. Note also that due to the 6-alternative forced
choice recognition test, the chance of guessing correctly was
relatively low (16.7%).
For T1, 30 out of 60 triplets were tested. Each triplet was tested
with one of the cue–target associations (e.g., cue: person, target:
location) in both directions. For the open-loop condition, cue–
target associations were presented across four blocks (with a
single, randomly assigned, pairwise association from each triplet
tested in each block), making a total of 120 trials. Only the directly
encoded pairwise associations for open-loops were tested at T1
(i.e., no inference test was performed). For the closed-loop condi-
tion, the associations were presented across six blocks (i.e., three
pairwise associations, tested in both directions, randomly assigned
across blocks), making a total of 180 trials. A 20 s break would
follow every 30 trials. At T2, participants performed the same
cued-recognition task as during T1 with all the triplets tested,
making a total of 240 and 360 trials for the open- and closed-loop
condition, respectively.
For the open-loop condition, participants performed an addi-
tional inference test following the main cued-recognition task at
T2. For example, if a participant had encoded the pairwise asso-
ciations between Barack Obama and hammer and hammer and
kitchen, the nonencoded association between Barack Obama and
kitchen would be tested in both directions (i.e., cue: Barack
Obama, retrieve: kitchen; cue: kitchen, retrieve: Barack Obama)
during the inference task. For the inference task, the nonencoded
associations for each open-loop were tested, in each direction,
across two blocks, making a total of 120 trials. A 20 s break would
follow every 30 trials. Participants were not explicitly told that
these were inference trials and carried out the task in the same
manner as for directly encoded pairs.
In the main analysis comparing T1 versus T2, we only used
retrieval trials at T2 for triplets that were not tested at T1 in order
to control for possible testing effects. We include further analyses
that directly compare retrieval accuracy and dependency at T2 for
previously tested triplets versus triplets tested for the first time
(reported in the online supplemental material).
Modeling retrieval dependency. Six independent 2  2 con-
tingency tables for the observed data and independent model were
created for each participant in order to assess the dependency
between the retrieval of two items (e.g., person, object) when cued
by a common item (e.g., location) ABAC, and between the retrieval
of a common item (e.g., location) when cued by the other two
items (e.g., person, object) BABA. Once constructed, we calculated
the proportion of joint retrieval and joint nonretrieval in the data
and independent model for each contingency table separately, by
summing the leading diagonal cells and dividing by the total
number of events (i.e., the proportion of events where two over-
lapping pairwise associations within an event were both retrieved
either correctly or incorrectly). We then averaged this measure
across the six contingency tables to provide us with a single
measure of the proportion of joint retrieval and nonretrieval for the
data and independent model separately. For brevity, we refer to
this measure as the “proportion of joint retrieval,” but note that it
includes both the proportion of joint retrieval and joint nonre-
trieval.
The independent model assumes that pairwise associations for a
given event are retrieved independently of one another—that is, if
you retrieve one pairwise association from an event (un)success-
fully this does not predict your ability to (un)successfully re-
trieve another pairwise association from the same event. As
such, the independent model serves as a lower bound which we
can compare with the proportion of joint retrieval in the data.
Note, that the proportion of joint retrieval measure scales with
accuracy, and as such only comparisons between the data and
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independent model (i.e., the “dependency” measure reported in
the following text) are meaningful.
The 2  2 contingency tables for the data shows the number of
events that fall within the four cells (i.e., for the ABAC analysis,
both AB and AC correct; AB incorrect and AC correct; AB correct
and AC incorrect; and both AB and AC incorrect, where AB  cue
with location (A) and retrieve person (B) and similarly for AC,
where C stands for object). The table for the independent model
(see Table 1) shows the predicted proportion of events that fall in
the four cells, given a participant’s overall level of accuracy, if the
retrieval of within-event associations is assumed to be indepen-
dent. For a given participant, the proportion of correct retrievals
of, for instance, item B when cued by A is denoted by PAB (i.e.,
the mean performance for B when cued by A across all events).
For the independent model, when cued by A, the probability of
(1) correctly retrieving both B and C (across all events) is equal
to PABPAC; (2) correctly retrieving B but not C is equal to PAB
(1  PAC); (3) correctly retrieving C but not B is equal to (1 –
PAB) PAC; and (4) incorrectly retrieving both B and C is equal
to (1 – PAB)  (1 – PAC).
Statistical analyses. For the main analysis of retrieval accu-
racy (proportion correct), we report a 2  2  2 (Session 
Loop  Sleep) mixed ANOVA with the within-subject factor
session referring to T1 (immediate) versus T2 (12-hr delay), the
between-subjects factor Loop referring to whether participants
encoded open- versus closed-loops, and the between-subjects fac-
tor Sleep referring to whether T1 was followed by sleep versus
wakefulness. The main analysis reports memory performance for
items at T2 that were not previously tested at T1. We also report
a 2  2  2 (Tested  Loop  Sleep) mixed ANOVA for memory
performance at T2 with the within-subject factor Tested referring
to whether the triplets had previously been tested at T1 or not
(reported in the online supplemental material).
For the main dependency analysis, we reported a 2  2  2
(Session  Loop  Sleep) mixed ANOVA where the dependent
variable refers to the difference between the proportion of joint
retrieval in the data and independent model (referred to as ‘depen-
dency’). We also report a 2  2  2 (Tested  Loop  Sleep)
mixed ANOVA of retrieval dependency at T2 with the within-
subject factor tested again referring to whether triplets had previ-
ously been tested at T1 or not (reported in the online supplemental
material). We also report t tests comparing proportion of joint
retrieval in the data with their respective independent models (data
vs. independent model).
Alpha was set to .05 (two-tailed) for all statistical tests. For each
ANOVA, we report a partial eta-squared effect size (	p2). For t
tests, we report a Cohen’s d as the mean difference between the
condition divided by the pooled standard deviation across condi-
tions (Lakens, 2013) as an estimate of the between-subjects effect
size (regardless of whether the effect is within- or between-
subjects). For the sake of consistency, when any significant effect
is associated with a p value of  .04, or any nonsignificant effect
is associated with a p value of  .06, we note this regardless of
whether the effect is significant, nor whether the contrast is of
particular theoretical interest. All statistical analyses were con-
ducted using JASP (JASP Team, 2018).
Data availability. All second-level data (i.e., means per par-
ticipant and condition) across all experiments for retrieval accu-
racy and dependency are freely available at http://osf.io/k495x/.
Results
Retrieval accuracy. Mean proportion correct (and standard
deviations) across session, loop, and sleep are presented in Table
2, and mean proportion correct across loop and session (collapsed
across sleep) is presented in Figure 3. Figure 3 suggests retrieval
accuracy decreased over time, from T1 to T2, with perhaps more
forgetting for open- than closed-loops.
A 2  2  2 (Session  Loop  Sleep) ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of session, with accuracy decreasing from T1 to
T2, F(1, 100)  352.02, p  .001, 	p2  .78. We also saw a
significant interaction between session and sleep, F(1, 100) 
59.06, p  .001, 	p2  .37, with significantly more forgetting
between T1 and T2 in the awake relative to sleep condition. Thus,
we see significant forgetting across sessions that is further modu-
lated by whether participants slept between T1 and T2. This
provides a high degree of variability in performance to assess
whether dependency changes as a function of forgetting, with
mean retrieval accuracy ranging from .51 to .73.
No further main effects were seen for loop, F(1, 100)  .16, p 
.69, 	p2  .01, and sleep, F(1, 100)  3.88, p  .052, 	p2  .04
(though we note the borderline p value for the main effect of
sleep). A further interaction between session and loop was also
seen, F(1, 100)  42.46, p  .001, 	p2  .30, revealing greater
forgetting for open- than closed-loops. This interaction appeared to
occur regardless of sleep, given there was no Session  Loop 
Sleep interaction, F(1, 100)  .15, p  .70, 	p2  .01. Thus,
forgetting between T1 and T2 was modulated independently by
both sleep and loop.
Retrieval dependency. Mean proportion of joint retrieval
(and standard deviations) for the data and independent model for
open- and closed-loops, collapsed across sleep and awake condi-
tions, are presented in Table 3 (for the means across all conditions,
the data are available at http://osf.io/k495x/). Figure 4 shows the
dependency across sessions and loop (collapsed across sleep and
awake conditions).
Consistent with previous research (Horner & Burgess, 2014),
we saw no evidence of dependency for open-loops at T1, t(51) 
1.63, p  .11, d  .09, but dependency was seen for closed-loops,
t(51)  6.03, p  .001, d  .20, at T1. The critical question is what
occurs at T2 given a significant proportion of the pairwise asso-
ciations have been forgotten. Figure 4 shows that a similar pattern
of dependency is seen at T2, with closed-loops still showing
dependency, t(51)  5.31, p  .001, d  .23, whereas significant
Table 1
Contingency Table for the Independent Model for Correct and
Incorrect Retrieval, Over N Events, for Elements B and C When
Cued by A
Retrieval of
Element C
Retrieval of Element B
Correct (PAB) Incorrect (1 – PAB)
Correct (PAC) i1N PABiPACi i1
N PACi1  PABi
Incorrect (1  PAC) i1N PABi1  PACi i1
N 1  PABi1  PACi
Note. i  1 to N.
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antidependency was seen for open-loops, t(51)  2.48, p  .02,
d  .26.
Antidependency in the open-loops suggests that associations
interfere with each other. It is possible that antidependency
emerges during the retention period between T1 and T2 as anti-
dependency is not observed at T1. Although no significant anti-
dependency was seen at T1, we believe it is likely that the
associations already interfere with each other either at immediate
retrieval, or at the point of encoding, given that a lower proportion
of joint retrieval in the data, relative to the independent model, is
observed immediately after encoding. Consistent with this, the
main analysis showed that dependency did not change signifi-
cantly between T1 and T2 across the closed- and open-loop con-
ditions. Note, this antidependency effect is not replicated in Ex-
periments 2 through 4.
A 2  2  2 (Session  Loop  Sleep) ANOVA on the
dependency revealed a significant main effect of loop, F(1, 100) 
37.02, p  .001, 	p2  .27, confirming significantly greater depen-
dency for closed- than open-loops. We saw no evidence for
changes in dependency across session, F(1, 100)  .25, p  .62,
	p
2  .01, nor did session interact with sleep, F(1, 100)  .16, p 
.70, 	p2  .01, or loop, F(1, 100)  .94, p  .34, 	p2  .01. Indeed,
no other significant effects or interactions were seen (Fs  1.17,
ps  .28), beyond the main effect of loop. Thus, we found no
evidence to suggest that dependency was modulated by session or
sleep. In sum, despite large variation in retrieval performance at T2
relative to T1 as a function of sleep (and testing; see the online
supplemental material), dependency in the closed-loop and open-
loop condition remained consistent across all conditions.
Mnemonic integration during sleep? As outlined in the pre-
ceding text, we were also interested in assessing the possible role
that sleep plays in integrating overlapping information. For this
analysis, we focus solely on the open-loops as these are equivalent
to the A–B A–C structures encoded in Lau et al. (2010). The main
analysis in the preceding text found an overall effect of sleep on
accuracy (that did not interact with loop), but no effect on depen-
dency. Here, given our specific interest in whether sleep modulates
mnemonic inference, we only report analysis for the open-loop
condition (as no inference is possible for closed-loops).
For open-loop retrieval accuracy, a 2  2 (Session  Sleep)
ANOVA revealed a significant Session  Sleep interaction, F(1,
50)  25.30, p  .001, 	p2  .34, confirming the preceding
analysis showing that sleep decreases forgetting for directly en-
coded pairs. We also assessed participants’ ability to infer nonen-
coded B–C pairs at T2 (see Table 4). Note, we did not assess B–C
inference at T1 because this may have increased participants’
awareness of the relationship between all overlapping pairs, bias-
ing us to finding increases in dependency for open-loops.
One participant in the sleep condition was excluded from this
analysis due to a failure to respond during the inference task
Figure 3. Mean proportion correct for open- and closed-loops at test sessions T1 and T2 for Experiments 1
through 4. For T2, only trials where participants retrieved events not previously tested at T1 are included. Error
bars represent 
/1 standard error. Exp  Experiment.  p  .01.  p  .001.
Table 2
Mean Proportion Correct (and Standard Deviations in
Parentheses) at Test Sessions at T1 and T2 for Experiments 1
Through 4
Experiment Loop
Session
T1 T2
Experiment 1
Sleep condition Open .73 (.16) .61 (.16)
Closed .72 (.25) .69 (.27)
Awake condition Open .73 (.14) .51 (.14)
Closed .68 (.21) .54 (.23)
Experiment 2 Open .71 (.17) .41 (.14)
Closed .74 (.17) .46 (.20)
Experiment 3 Open n/a .35 (.15)
Closed n/a .51 (.24)
Experiment 4 Open .69 (.18) .37 (.14)
Closed .73 (.18) .50 (.19)
Note. For T2, only trials where participants retrieved cue–target associ-
ations not previously tested at T1 are included. n/a  not applicable.
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(missing responses .80). Accordingly, 51 participants (26 in the
awake condition, and 25 in the sleep condition) were included in
the analysis. Consistent with Lau et al. (2010), we saw greater B–C
inference performance in the sleep, relative to awake condition,
t(49)  2.03, p  .048, d  .57 (though we note the borderline p
value). Importantly, a 2  2 (Session  Sleep) ANOVA failed to
show any evidence for a change in dependency for open-loops
between T1 and T2, F(1, 50)  .72, p  .40, 	p2  .01 (see Table
5), nor did session interact with sleep, F(1, 50)  .16, p  .70,
	p
2  .01 Thus, we see evidence for increases in inference perfor-
mance, but no evidence for an increase in dependency, as a
function of sleep.
Discussion
Experiment 1 modulated retrieval accuracy by manipulating: (1)
the time between study and test, (2) whether participants slept
between study and test, and (3) whether pairwise associations were
previously tested or not (results reported in the online supplemen-
tal material). We saw evidence for effects of all three manipula-
tions on retrieval accuracy for pairwise associations, such that
across conditions we saw large variations in the amount of forget-
ting. Despite this, we saw no evidence for changes in dependency
in either open- or closed-loops. No dependency (or antidepen-
dency) was seen for open-loops, and dependency was consistently
seen for closed-loops. Experiment 1 therefore provides evidence
that dependency does not change over time—closed-loops retain
their dependency whereas open-loops do not show dependency.
We also saw no evidence for mnemonic integration during sleep
(as measured by retrieval dependency), suggesting that the role
sleep plays in increasing mnemonic inference is unlikely to be
driven by encoding generalization during sleep and is more likely
driven by “on-the-fly” processes at the point of retrieval; the
probability of which is increased due to less forgetting for directly
encoded pairs in the sleep than awake condition. Although we saw
no evidence for increases in dependency for open-loops following
sleep, participants were able to make the correct mnemonic infer-
ences at a level well above chance. Our task instructions were
ambiguous in relation to the inference task—that is, participants
were presented with inference trials as if they were retrieval trials.
Further work is needed to clarify whether participants were mak-
ing correct inferences based on false memories for nonencoded
pairs, or whether they were making informed inferences. However,
the lack of dependency following sleep suggests that this inference
process is likely to be occurring at the point of retrieval.
Experiment 2
Despite evidence for dependency in the closed-loop condition
after 12 hr in Experiment 1, we wondered whether increased
forgetting might lead to decreases in dependency. Specifically, we
speculated that the amount of forgetting in Experiment 1 was not
sufficient to produce fragmentation, and in turn, decreases in
dependency. In Experiments 2 through 4 we therefore tested par-
Table 3
Mean Proportion of Joint Retrieval (and Standard Deviations in
Parentheses) for the Data and Independent Model for Test
Sessions at T1 and T2 for Experiments 1 Through 4
Experiment Loop
T1 T2
Data Independent Data Independent
Experiment 1 Open .62 (.14) .64 (.12) .52 (.10) .55 (.06)
Closed .71 (.17) .68 (.18) .69 (.15) .66 (.17)
Experiment 2 Open .60 (.16) .61 (.15) .56 (.08) .55 (.08)
Closed .73 (.14) .67 (.16) .62 (.08) .58 (.09)
Experiment 3 Open n/a n/a .57 (.10) .58 (.08)
Closed n/a n/a .69 (.09) .61 (.11)
Experiment 4 Open .57 (.16) .59 (.12) .56 (.10) .56 (.08)
Closed .70 (.15) .66 (.16) .60 (.09) .57 (.07)
Note. For Experiment 1, the proportion of joint retrieval is collapsed
across the sleep and awake conditions. For T2, only trials where partici-
pants retrieved cue–target associations not previously tested at T1 are
included. n/a  not applicable.
Figure 4. Dependency for open- and closed-loops at test sessions T1 and T2 for Experiments 1 through 4. For
T2, only trials where participants retrieved events previously not tested at T1 are included. Error bars
represent 
/–1 standard error. Exp  Experiment. ns  not significant. p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
9ALL-OR-NONE FORGETTING OF COMPLEX EPISODIC EVENTS
ticipants after a week, rather than a 12-hr delay. This extended
interval between T1 and T2 produced greater amounts of forget-
ting relative to Experiment 1, creating a sterner test for our
hypothesis that event-based representations are forgotten in an
all-or-none manner.
Method
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with the following
exceptions. Experiment 2 equated to a 2  2 design, with the
factors session and loop. No factor of sleep was included, given the
interval between study and test was 1 week.
Participants. Fifty-two participants gave informed consent to
participate in Experiment 2. Participants were recruited from the
University of York student population. Participants took part in
exchange for course credit or monetary compensation. Participants
were allocated to one of two conditions. Twenty-six participants in
the open-loop condition (23 female, M age  19.46 years, age
range  18–23) and 26 participants in the closed-loop condition
(23 female, M age  20.00 years, age range  18–26).
Procedure. In order to increase the amount of forgetting rel-
ative to Experiment 1, the two sessions were separated by one
week. All sessions took place in the afternoon. Encoding and T1
took place between approximately 12 to 5 p.m. (open-loop: M 
2:31 p.m., range  12:00–4:46 p.m.; closed-loop: M  2:15 p.m.,
range  11:58 a.m.–4:47 p.m.). T2 took place 1 week later
between approximately 12 to 5 p.m. (open-loop: M  2:29 p.m.,
range  11:51 a.m.–4:41 p.m.; closed-loop: M  2:08 p.m.,
range  11:58 a.m.–4:41 p.m.). Missing responses during test
(M  .04, SD  .04) were again treated as incorrect trials. There
was no difference in the proportion of missed responses (collapsed
across session) between open- and closed-loops, t(50)  .89, p 
.38, d  .25.
Results
Retrieval accuracy. Mean proportion correct across condi-
tions are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. Retrieval accuracy was
.72 at T1 and .43 at T2. This is compared with retrieval accuracy
of .72 at T1 and .59 at T2 in Experiment 1. Thus, increasing the
interval between T1 and T2 to one week led to numerically greater
forgetting relative to a 12-hr interval. A 2  2 (Session  Loop)
ANOVA revealed a main effect of session, F(1, 50)  318.83, p 
.001, 	p2  .86, confirming a significant decrease in performance at
T2 relative to T1. No further effects or interactions were seen
(Fs  1.01, ps  .32). As such, Experiment 2 produced a signif-
icant amount of forgetting from T1 to T2, regardless of whether the
triplets were encoded as open- or closed-loops.
Retrieval dependency. Mean proportion of joint retrieval
(and standard deviations) for the data and independent model
across conditions are presented in Table 3. Figure 4 shows the
dependency across session and loop. As in Experiment 1, we saw
no evidence for dependency for open-loops at T1, t(25)  .67, p 
.51, d  .03, or T2, t(25)  .28, p  .78, d  .03, but significant
evidence for dependency for closed-loops at both T1, t(25)  5.90,
p  .001, d  .42, and T2, t(25)  5.31, p  .001, d  .51. A 2 
2 (Session  Loop) ANOVA on dependency revealed a significant
effect of loop, F(1, 50)  39.96, p  .001, 	p2  .44, confirming
that dependency was significantly greater in the closed- relative to
open-loop condition. No interaction between session and loop was
seen, F(1, 50)  3.34, p  .07, 	p2  .06. In order to interrogate
this marginal interaction further, we performed a t test between
dependency at T1 and T2 separately for each loop type. Consistent
with the main analyses, we saw no evidence for a change in
dependency for either closed-, t(25)  1.72, p  .10, d  .49, or
open-loops, t(25)  .733, p  .47, d  .20, between T1 and T2.
Critically, as shown in the preceding text, dependency was still
significant in the closed-loop condition at T2. As in Experiment 1,
despite high levels of forgetting between T1 and T2, we saw no
evidence for a decrease in dependency between T1 and T2 for
closed-loops.
Discussion
Experiment 2 produced greater amounts of forgetting following
an interval of 1 week between study and test, relative to Experi-
ment 1. Despite this increase in forgetting, as measured by re-
trieval accuracy, we again saw no decrease in dependency for
closed-loops, nor any increase in dependency for open-loops.
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that forgetting can be affected by
several post-encoding factors, such as the interval between study
and test, post-encoding sleep, and retrieval practice (see the online
supplemental material). However, across these factors, we find no
evidence for decreases in dependency for closed-loops.
Experiment 3
Retrieval accuracy is typically greater for closed- than open-
loops when both conditions are learned within-subject (i.e., each
participant learns both closed- and open-loops; Horner et al.,
Table 4
Mean Proportion Correct (and Standard Deviations in
Parentheses) for Encoded Cue–Target Associations at T1 and
T2, and Nonencoded Pairs at T2 for the Open-Loop Condition
in Experiment 1
Condition
Encoded Nonencoded
T1 T2 T2
Sleep .73 (.16) .61 (.16) .53 (.22)
Awake .73 (.14) .51 (.14) .42 (.29)
Note. For T2, only trials where participants retrieved cue–target associ-
ations not previously tested at T1 are included.
Table 5
Mean Proportion of Joint Retrieval (and Standard Deviations in
Parentheses) for the Data and Independent Model for Test
Sessions T1 and T2 for the Open-Loop Condition in
Experiment 1
Condition
T1 T2
Data Independent Data Independent
Sleep .62 (.14) .64 (.11) .54 (.10) .56 (.07)
Awake .62 (.15) .63 (.14) .51 (.09) .53 (.05)
Note. For T2, only trials where participants retrieved cue–target associ-
ations not previously tested at T1 are included.
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2015). In Experiment 1 and 2, we saw little evidence that retrieval
accuracy was higher for closed- than open-loops. In Experiment 3,
we aimed to assess whether the lack of difference in retrieval
accuracy between closed- and open-loops in Experiments 1 and 2
was a function of the between-subjects design. This is theoretically
important because if closed-loops are associated with higher ac-
curacy relative to open-loops in a within-subject, but not between-
subjects manipulation, it might suggest a possible competitive
mechanism between mnemonic representations (see General Dis-
cussion). In Experiment 3, participants learned both closed- and
open-loops at T1 and were tested in a single session (T2) after a
week. Note that no immediate test was performed as we wanted to
keep the overall number of triplets per condition consistent across
Experiments 1 through 3 (30 per condition). Experiment 3 also
provided a further opportunity to replicate the pattern of depen-
dency seen for closed- and open-loops across the course of a week.
Method
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the following
exceptions.
Participants. Twenty-six participants (22 female, M age 
19.35, age range  18–23) gave informed consent to participate in
Experiment 3. Participants were recruited from the University of
York student population. Participants took part in exchange for
course credit or monetary compensation.
Materials. Sixty randomized location-person-objects triplets
were generated for each participant. Thirty triplets were randomly
assigned to the within-subject open- and closed-loop conditions,
respectively.
Procedure. The two sessions were separated by one week. All
sessions took place in the afternoon. Encoding took place between
approximately 12 to 5 p.m. (M  2:24 p.m., range  11:57
a.m.–4:41 p.m.). T2 took place one week later between approxi-
mately 12 to 5 p.m. (M  2:23 p.m., range  11:56 a.m.–4:39
p.m.).
Encoding. Participants were presented with specific pairwise
associations for each of the 60 triplets. For 30 out of the 60 triplets,
participants encoded all three possible pairwise associations form-
ing closed-loops. For the remaining 30 triplets, participants en-
coded two out of three possible pairwise associations forming
open-loops. The encoding phase consisted of three blocks of 30,
60, and 60 trials, making a total of 150 encoding trials. During the
first block, only pairwise associations for closed-loops were pre-
sented. This ensured that the duration between encoding of the last
pairwise association and T2 was consistent across closed- and
open-loops. In Blocks 2 and 3, the open- and closed-loops asso-
ciations were presented randomly in an intermixed manner.
Test. No immediate test followed encoding. This was done in
order to maintain consistency in the number of closed- and open-
loops tested at T2 across Experiments 2 and 3. At T2, all 60 triplets
were tested. Cue–target associations were presented across six
blocks, making a total of 300 trials. Note, none of these cue–target
associations had been tested previously at T1. As at encoding,
open- and closed-loops were presented randomly within each
block. As open-loops were formed of only two out of the three
possible pairwise associations, the four possible cue–target asso-
ciations per open-loop were randomly distributed across four out
of the six blocks. Note that this necessitates that the number of
trials per block can vary between participants. Missing responses
(M  .04, SD  .07) were treated as incorrect trials. There was no
difference between open- and closed-loops in the proportion of
missing responses, t(25)  1.97, p  .06, d  .16 (though we note
the borderline p value).
Analysis. For retrieval accuracy, we report a paired samples t
test comparing performance for closed- versus open-loops. For
retrieval dependency, we report a paired samples t test comparing
the proportion of joint retrieval for the data and independent model
for closed- versus open-loops.
Results
Retrieval accuracy. Mean proportion correct for open- and
closed-loops are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. Retrieval accuracy
at T2 was .43 (averaged across open- and closed-loops). This is
comparable to .43 in Experiment 2. Accordingly, we see numeri-
cally similar performance at T2 for Experiment 2 and 3. Impor-
tantly, accuracy for closed-loops (.51) was greater than open-loops
(.35) following a one week delay, t(25)  6.31, p  .001, d  .84.
In contrast to Experiment 2, here we saw a significant difference
in performance between closed- and open-loops.
Retrieval dependency. Consistent with Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2, dependency was greater for closed- than open-
loops, t(25)  5.35, p  .001, d  1.33, with closed-loops again
showing significantly greater proportion of joint retrieval in the
data than in the independent model, t(25)  6.40, p  .001, d 
.73, and open-loops showing no evidence for dependency, t(25) 
.56, p  .58, d  .08 (see Table 3 and Figure 4).
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the pattern of dependency seen in
Experiments 1 and 2. We saw no dependency for open-loops and
significant dependency for closed-loops. Presuming a significant
amount of forgetting has occurred in Experiment 3, as seen in
Experiments 1 and 2, we again showed that dependency for closed-
loops is resilient to forgetting. Interestingly, we saw a significant
difference in retrieval accuracy between closed- and open-loops; a
pattern we did not see in Experiment 2. The critical difference
between Experiments 2 and 3 is that the loop manipulation was a
between-subjects factor in Experiment 2 but a within-subject fac-
tor in Experiment 3.
However, Experiment 3 did not include an immediate test (in
contrast to Experiment 2). We do not know whether this difference
between closed- versus open-loops in a within-subject design
would also be present at T1. In other words, is the difference in
performance between closed- and open-loops in Experiment 3 a
result of high retrieval accuracy for closed- versus open-loops
(regardless of retention interval), or are closed-loops associated
with higher levels of retention over time? In Experiment 4, the
loop manipulation was again a within-subject factor, however we
also included an immediate, as well as delayed, test. Note, this
decreased the number of triplets per condition from 30 to 15.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 included a test at both T1 and T2. This allowed us
to see if the difference in retrieval accuracy for closed- versus
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open-loops at T2 in Experiment 3 was also present at T1. It also
presented an opportunity to replicate the T2 retrieval accuracy
difference seen in Experiment 3. Finally, Experiment 4 offered an
opportunity to replicate the pattern of dependency for closed-loops
seen in Experiments 1 through 3.
Method
Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 with the following
exceptions.
Participants. Twenty-seven participants gave informed con-
sent to participate in Experiment 4. Participants were recruited
from the University of York student population. Participants took
part in exchange for course credit or monetary compensation. One
participant was excluded due to a failure to respond at T2 (missing
responses  .50). Accordingly, 26 participants (25 female, M
age  19.27, age range  18–23) were included in the analysis.
Procedure. Encoding took place between approximately 12 to
5 p.m. (M  2:26 p.m., range  12:02–4:56 p.m.). T2 took place
one week later between approximately 12 to 5 p.m. (M  2:26
p.m., range  11:47 a.m.–16:48 p.m.). For T1, 30 out of 60 triplets
were tested. Triplets were randomly assigned to the within-subject
condition tested (i.e., tested at T1) versus not-tested (i.e., not tested
at T1; reported in the online supplemental material). This allowed
us to assess retrieval accuracy and dependency for 15 open-loops
and 15 closed-loops immediately after encoding. Cue–target asso-
ciations were presented across six blocks, making a total of 150
trials. A break of 20 s followed every 25 trials. At T2, all 60 triplets
were tested. Cue–target associations were presented across six
blocks, making a total of 300 trials. A 20 s break followed every
30 trials. Again, the four possible cue–target associations per
open-loop were randomly distributed across the six blocks. We
treated missing responses (M  .06, SD  .05) as incorrect trials.
There was no difference between open- and closed-loops (col-
lapsed across session) in the proportion of missing responses,
t(25)  1.60, p  .12, d  .20.
Analysis. For the main analysis of accuracy, we report a 2 
2 (Session  Loop) within-subject ANOVA. We also report a 2 
2 (Tested  Loop) within-subject ANOVA for retrieval accuracy
at T2 (reported in the online supplemental material). For the
dependency analysis, we report a 2  2 (Session  Loop) within-
subject ANOVA where the dependent variable again refers to the
difference between the proportion of joint retrieval in the data and
independent model. We also report a 2  2 (Tested  Loop)
within-subject ANOVA where the within-subject factor Tested
refers to whether the triplets had previously been tested at T1 or
not (reported in the online supplemental material).
Results
Retrieval accuracy. Mean proportion correct across condi-
tions are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3. Retrieval accuracy was
.71 at T1 and .43 at T2. This is consistent with performance seen
in Experiments 2 and 3. A 2  2 (Session  Loop) ANOVA
revealed a main effect of session, F(1, 25)  182.14, p  .001,
	p
2  .88, in addition to a significant main effect of loop, F(1,
25)  27.61, p  .001, 	p2  .53, with greater accuracy for closed-
relative to open-loops at both T1, t(25)  2.86, p  .008, d  .26,
and T2, t(25)  5.12, p  .001, d  .79. Interestingly, a significant
Session  Loop was also observed, F(1, 25)  10.40, p  .01,
	p
2  .29, with the difference between closed- and open-loops
increasing from T1 to T2. Thus, closed-loops show both higher
retrieval accuracy (regardless of retention interval) and higher
levels of retention relative to open-loops.
Retrieval dependency. Mean proportion of joint retrieval
(and standard deviations) for the data and independent model
across conditions are presented in Table 3. Dependency across
session and loop is shown in Figure 4. Consistent with Experi-
ments 1 through 3, we found no evidence for dependency for
open-loops at T1, t(25)  1.39, p  .18, d  .16, and T2, t(25) 
.24, p  .81, d  .03. Similarly, we saw significant dependency for
closed-loops at both T1, t(25)  3.29, p  .01, d  .25, and T2,
t(25)  3.21, p  .01, d  .38. A 2  2 (Session  Loop)
within-subject ANOVA on dependency revealed a significant
main effect of Loop, F(1, 50)  20.20, p  .001, 	p2  .45, with
significantly greater dependency for closed- than open-loops. No
other significant main effect or interaction was seen (Fs  1.71,
ps  .20). Consistent with Experiments 1 through 3, closed-loops
retain their dependency despite high levels of forgetting.
Discussion
Experiment 4 replicated Experiments 1 through 3, showing
consistent dependency for closed-loops despite high levels of
forgetting. Experiment 4 showed higher retrieval accuracy for
closed- than open-loops at T2, consistent with Experiment 3. This
accuracy difference was present at T1 (consistent with the results
of Horner et al., 2015), however the effect was significantly greater
after a week. This presents evidence that the structure of overlap-
ping associations can affect long-term retention, but seemingly
only when structures are manipulated in a within-subject design
(as in Experiments 3 and 4, relative to Experiment 2). We return to
this finding in the General Discussion.
A Model of Independent Forgetting
Across four experiments we provide evidence for consistent
levels of retrieval dependency, despite varying levels of forgetting.
We consistently saw evidence for dependency for closed-loops at
both T1 and T2 and, importantly, we saw that dependency was
retained despite variable levels of forgetting. If complex events
fragment as a function of forgetting, such that some aspects of the
memory trace are forgotten more quickly than others (e.g., kitchen
is forgotten, but not hammer or Barack Obama), then we would
expect to see a decrease in dependency over time.
To ensure that the levels of dependency seen at T2 across
Experiments 1 through 4 were greater than expected if forgetting
was independent, we created a new model of independent forget-
ting. The independent model used in the main analyses predicts the
level of dependency if the retrieval of associations for a given
event are independent. It takes into account each participant’s
retrieval accuracy at each time point (separately) but does not take
into account the amount of forgetting for each participant. Accord-
ingly, we created a model that predicted the level of dependency at
T2, given a participant’s retrieval accuracy and rate of forgetting
between T1 and T2. The model can therefore be thought of as a
model of independent forgetting, as opposed to a model of inde-
pendent retrieval. It predicts the level of dependency expected at
T2 if events are forgotten in an independent manner.
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We simulated individuals’ retrieval data across all events and
pairwise associations at T2 based on their performance at T1 and
their overall level of forgetting (i.e., the difference in retrieval
accuracy between T1 and T2). Note, the model includes a single
forgetting parameter, such that the mean rate of forgetting is (on
average) uniform across all events and element-types. The simu-
lated data was based on the assumption of independent forgetting,
such that forgetting of one pairwise association for an event was
not predictive of forgetting for any other pairwise association for
that event. Specifically, we took performance for each T1 retrieval
trial, across all cue-test pairs, which resulted in a 6  N matrix
(with six cue-test pairs, and N events) where each trial was either
correct or incorrect. We then simulated performance at T2 by
converting correct trials to incorrect trials randomly until mean
performance for the 6  N matrix was equated to observed
performance at T2. Importantly, each correct trial at T1 had a
probability of being simulated as incorrect at T2 based on the mean
level of forgetting for that participant. We then calculated the level
of retrieval dependency for this simulated data set. This gives us
the level of dependency for an individual participant at T2 under
the assumption of independent forgetting. If the dependency seen
in the observed data is greater than the simulated data, then this
provides positive evidence that forgetting of the pairwise associ-
ations for a complex event does not occur in an independent
manner. For each participant, we simulated 100 data sets, and
present the mean dependency from across these simulations. Be-
cause Experiment 3 did not include an immediate test, we could
only assess independent forgetting in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. We
focused our modeling solely on closed-loops, given this is the
condition that shows dependency at T1 and T2.
Results
Mean proportion of joint retrieval (and standard deviations) for
the data and independent model for the simulated and observed
data at T2 are presented in Table 6. We first asked whether
dependency for closed-loops in the simulated data at T2 showed a
decrease relative to observed dependency at T1. In other words, if
forgetting was independent, does our model predict a decrease in
dependency between T1 and T2?
We first report a 2  3 (Session  Experiment) ANOVA where
the within-subject factor Session refers to the observed depen-
dency at T1 versus the simulated dependency at T2 and the
between-subjects factor Experiment refers to Experiment 1, 2, and
4. This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Session, F(1,
101)  61.91, p  .001, 	p2  .38, with dependency decreasing
between T1 and T2. A Session  Experiment interaction was also
seen, F(2, 101)  11.77, p  .001, 	p2  .19, with a significantly
greater decrease in dependency between T1 and T2 in Experiment
2 relative to Experiment 1, t(25)  3.52, p  .01, d  1.09, and
Experiment 4, t(25)  2.18, p  .04, d  .71. Our model of
independent forgetting therefore predicts a significant decrease in
dependency between T1 and T2 for closed-loops. No such de-
crease was seen in the observed dependency in Experiments 1, 2,
and 4.
We also performed a Bayesian pairwise t test comparing ob-
served dependency at T1 with simulated dependency at T2 across
all participants from Experiments 1, 2, and 4 (N  104). The Bayes
factor was 1,000 in favor of the hypothesis that dependency
should decrease as a function of independent forgetting (ex-
ceedance probability  .99; prior Cauchy distribution r  .707,
centered at 0; null hypothesis  no decrease in dependency be-
tween T1 and T2). This provides strong evidence that dependency
should decrease if closed-loops fragment as a function of forget-
ting.
We next asked whether we saw greater dependency for closed-
loops in the observed data at T2 relative to the simulated data at
T2. This analysis tells us whether the observed dependency at T2
is greater than that predicted by the independent model of forget-
ting. We report a 2  3 (Model  Experiment) ANOVA with the
within-subject factor Model referring to observed dependency at
T2 versus the simulated dependency at T2. Here we saw a signif-
icant main effect of Model, F(1, 101)  10.43, p  .01, 	p2  .09,
with greater dependency in the observed relative to the simulated
data.
Finally, we performed a Bayesian pairwise t test comparing
observed dependency at T1 with observed dependency at T2
across all participants from Experiments 1, 2, and 4 (N  104).
The Bayes factor  5.41 in favor of the null hypothesis that
dependency does not decrease as a function of forgetting (ex-
ceedance probability  .84; prior Cauchy distribution r  .707,
centered at 0; null hypothesis  no decrease in dependency be-
tween T1 and T2), provides positive evidence that dependency
does not decrease over time.
Discussion
The independent forgetting model estimates dependency at T2
under the assumption that cue–target associations within an event
are independently forgotten. Compared with the observed depen-
dency, we show that independent forgetting of individual event
elements predicts a significant decrease in dependency between T1
and T2, implying a fragmentation of the underlying memory trace.
Critically, we also saw significantly greater dependency in the
observed data at T2 relative to the simulated data. A Bayesian
analysis also provided positive evidence that the observed depen-
dency does not decrease as a function of forgetting for closed-
loops.
General Discussion
Across four experiments, we provide consistent evidence for
retrieval dependency for closed-loops after a delay, despite vari-
Table 6
Mean Proportion of Joint Retrieval (and Standard Deviations in
Parentheses) for the Data and Independent Model at T2 for the
Simulated and Observed Data for Experiments 1, 2, and 4
Experiment
Simulated Observed
Data Independent Data Independent
Experiment 1 .68 (.16) .65 (.17) .69 (.15) .66 (.17)
Experiment 2 .61 (.08) .60 (.09) .62 (.08) .58 (.09)
Experiment 4 .58 (.08) .57 (.07) .60 (.09) .57 (.07)
Note. For Experiment 1, the proportion of joint retrieval is collapsed
across the sleep and awake condition. Only trials, where participants
retrieved cue–target associations not previously tested at T1 are included.
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able levels of forgetting. We also show that retrieval dependency
does not change for open-loops; they do not show retrieval depen-
dency immediately after encoding, nor after a delay. Further, we
developed a model of independent forgetting, providing evidence
for levels of dependency for closed-loops that are greater than that
predicted under an assumption of independent forgetting. To-
gether, we take these findings to support our hypothesis that
coherent (closed-loop) event representations tend to be forgotten in
an all-or-none manner, with closed-loops being more likely to
either be retained or forgotten in their entirety.
In Experiment 1, we showed that dependency for closed-loops is
retained across a 12-hr interval, irrespective of whether T1 is
followed by sleep or wakefulness. Consistent with previous find-
ings (e.g., Barrett & Ekstrand, 1972; Gais, Lucas, & Born, 2006;
Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924; Lahl, Wispel, Willigens, & Pi-
etrowsky, 2008; Plihal & Born, 1997; Tucker et al., 2006), we
showed that sleep reduces forgetting, but does not change the form
that forgetting takes. Experiment 1 also provided an opportunity to
directly assess the extent to which sleep (relative to being awake)
supports the integration of overlapping information (Lau et al.,
2010). We found no evidence that sleep promotes integration of
open-loops, but it does appear to improve our ability to make
inferences between related information (i.e., inferring that B–C
items are related after directly encoding A–B and A–C pairs).
In Experiment 2, we increased the interval between study and
test to 1 week, increasing overall levels of forgetting. Despite this
increase in forgetting, we saw no evidence for changes in depen-
dency for closed- or open-loops. Experiments 3 and 4 replicated
Experiment 2, providing further evidence for dependency for
closed-loops when the interval between study and test was 1 week.
We therefore provide consistent evidence that forgetting is not
associated with decreases in dependency for closed-loop events.
Experiments 3 and 4 also showed that the structure of the
underlying mnemonic representation can support both immediate
and long-term retention. Retrieval accuracy was higher for closed-
than open-loops, a difference that increased significantly over the
course of a week. Interestingly, this effect was only seen in a
within-subject design where each participant learned both closed-
and open-loops (in Experiments 3 and 4), but not in a between-
subjects design where each participant either learned closed- or
open-loops (in Experiment 2).
The results presented here have implications for (1) how coher-
ent event representations are forgotten, (2) whether sleep promotes
the integration of overlapping information, and (3) how associative
structure can boost retention of information in the long-term. We
discuss each of these topics in the following text.
Forgetting of Coherent Event Representations
Despite a long-standing interest in forgetting, little research has
focused on how memory representations change as a function of
forgetting. Here we used the presence of dependency to infer the
coherence of an underlying memory trace and asked how depen-
dency changes as a function of forgetting. A similar approach was
used by Brady et al. (2013), where they assessed dependency for
specific properties of an object (i.e., “exemplar” and “state”). They
found that dependency decreased over time, such that the exemplar
(e.g., shape of a glass) and state (e.g., contents of the glass) of an
object were forgotten independently. Thus, object- or item-based
representations appear to fragment over time. This result appears at
odds with the current results where we see no evidence for a
decrease in dependency for closed-loops over time. However, here
we were specifically interested in forgetting of coherent episodic
events that require the multimodal binding of three distinct ele-
ments or items—that is, a location, person, and object. Thus,
whereas Brady et al. (2013) focused on item-based representations,
specifically multiple aspects of an individual item, we were inter-
ested in event-based representations, specifically associations be-
tween multiple distinct items or elements.
Neuropsychology and neuroimaging studies have demonstrated
a functional dissociation between regions of the medial temporal
lobe, with the perirhinal cortex supporting item-based representa-
tions and the hippocampus supporting event-based representations
(Barense et al., 2005; Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; Diana,
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2010; Lee et al., 2005; Ranganath et al.,
2004). Although the perirhinal cortex has been implicated in
certain associative processes (Mayes et al., 2004; Mayes, Mon-
taldi, & Migo, 2007) and conjunctive representations (Barense,
Gaffan, & Graham, 2007; Bussey & Saksida, 2007) of items/
objects, such regions are not thought to support associations be-
tween multimodal representations (Diana et al., 2007; Eichen-
baum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007). Instead, it is the
hippocampus that has been implicated in the multimodal binding
that is required to form more complex event representations (Co-
hen et al., 1999; Damasio, 1989; Davachi, 2006; Eichenbaum et
al., 2007; Horner et al., 2012). The imagery task and memoranda
used here were designed to require cross-modal binding (Horner et
al., 2015; Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014) given that the hippocam-
pus has been shown to act as a convergence zone (Backus, Bosch,
Ekman, Grabovetsky, & Doeller, 2016) binding multimodal infor-
mation into coherent event representations (Damasio, 1989; Marr,
1971; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986). Thus, it is possible that the
differences in forgetting seen between the present studies and
Brady et al. (2013) relate to this dissociation between item-based
perirhinal representations and event-based hippocampal represen-
tations.
This dissociation is also apparent in the psychological literature
in relation to retrieval dependency. First, although Brady et al.
(2013) saw dependency between the retrieval successes of exem-
plar and state information immediately after encoding, they pro-
vided evidence that such dependency might be primarily driven by
encoding-related factors. Horner and Burgess (2014) provided
evidence against an encoding-based explanation of dependency for
more complex events by separating out the encoding of pairwise
associations for three element events—presenting each pairwise
association in separate encoding trials (as in the present studies).
No difference in dependency was seen between this ‘separated’
encoding condition relative to when all three elements were en-
coded on a single trial (Horner & Burgess, 2014). This suggests
that, even when tested immediately after encoding, the dependency
seen for item-based and event-based representations might be
driven by different factors. In the case of item-based representa-
tions; encoding-related factors such as attention, and in the case of
event-based representations; perhaps a retrieval-related process
that allows for holistic retrieval.
Evidence from the long-term source-memory literature also
suggests that there is a degree of asymmetry in relation to how
source details are bound to items, with information about color and
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location being directly, but independently, bound to item informa-
tion, but not each other (Starns & Hicks, 2005, 2008; see Hicks &
Starns, 2015 for a review). This lack of coherency and symmetry
in item-based representations might underlie the decreases in de-
pendency seen over time in Brady et al. (2013). As distinct aspects
of an item are stored in a relatively independent manner, they are
likely to also be forgotten in a similarly independent manner. In
contrast, event-based representations are more coherent and sym-
metrical in nature (Horner et al., 2015; Horner & Burgess, 2013)
and as such the forgetting of elements from a given event are more
likely to be related. Interestingly, Sekeres and colleagues (2016)
recently showed that ‘peripheral’ details from event-based mem-
ories are forgotten more rapidly than central details. We believe
that this difference in forgetting rates for peripheral and central
details might relate to the differences in the pattern of forgetting
for event- and item-based memories observed here and in Brady et
al. (2013), with central details of event-based memories (e.g.,
Barack Obama in the kitchen with a hammer) being more likely to
be forgotten in an all-or-none manner, and peripheral/item-based
details of event-based memories (e.g., the color vs. shape of
Barack Obama’s tie) being forgotten in an independent manner.
It has recently been proposed that item-based representations
that rely on the perirhinal cortex are more likely to be forgotten as
a result of interference (as opposed to decay; Sadeh et al., 2014).
This is because the neural representations for items in the perirhi-
nal cortex are likely distributed and overlapping in nature. Thus,
encoding similar objects results in interference due to their repre-
sentational overlap. However, event-based representations are
thought to be encoded in the hippocampus, where a pattern sepa-
ration process supported by the dentate gyrus (Bakker, Kirwan,
Miller, & Stark, 2008; Berron et al., 2016; Leutgeb, Leutgeb,
Moser, & Moser, 2007; Neunuebel & Knierim, 2014) and more
sparse representations (Barnes, McNaughton, Mizumori, Leonard,
& Lin, 1990; Viskontas, Knowlton, Steinmetz, & Fried, 2006) are
likely to reduce representational overlap between similar events.
This decrease in representational overlap decreases the likelihood
of interference (McClelland et al., 1995). Instead, forgetting for
hippocampal event-based representations is thought to be a result
of decay (Hardt et al., 2013).
Sadeh et al. (2016) provided behavioral evidence for this pro-
posed dissociation, showing that whereas recollection (a process
supported by hippocampal representations) decreased as a function
of time between study and test (consistent with forgetting via
decay), familiarity (a process supported by perirhinal representa-
tions) decreased as a function of experimentally induced interfer-
ence. Recent evidence using “precision” measures for assessing
object-color memory has shown that encoding similarly colored
objects causes interference, leading to a decrease in precision—
that is, participants can still remember the color, but with less
specificity than previously (Sun et al., 2017). This again supports
the notion that forgetting for item-based representations is more
likely driven by interference than decay.
The lack of a decrease in dependency can be taken as support for
the hypothesis that coherent (closed-loop) events tend to be for-
gotten in an all-or-none manner. If hippocampal event-based rep-
resentations were forgotten by a process of decay, as proposed by
Sadeh et al. (2014), this would suggest that decay is relatively
uniform across the separate elements of an event. Although there
is variation in the amount of decay across events, there would be
less variation within an event. An alternative decay account would
predict that variation is present in the rate of decay within an event,
however the process of retrieval compensates for this variation.
We have previously shown that closed-loops are supported by the
hippocampus, and retrieved by a process of pattern completion
(Horner et al., 2015; see Horner & Doeller, 2017 for a review).
Pattern completion allows for the retrieval of a complete memory
trace (i.e., pattern) in the presence of a partial or ambiguous input
(Gardner-Medwin, 1976; Hopfield, 1982; Marr, 1971; McClelland
et al., 1995; Treves & Rolls, 1992, 1994). Here, activation of a
single event element (e.g., a location) triggers the reactivation of
all other elements for that event (i.e., a person and an object).
Under such an account, decay could be nonuniform within an
event, but pattern completion in hippocampal subfield CA3 (Hop-
field, 1982; Treves & Rolls, 1992), or more widespread recurrency
within the hippocampal complex (Kumaran & McClelland, 2012),
would lead to the presence of dependency as long as the associa-
tions between some elements are sufficiently strong. However,
when decay is sufficient, the remaining associations may no longer
be able to support retrieval, meaning that the entire trace cannot be
retrieved. In other words, although decay might be nonuniform
within an event, pattern completion produces the appearance of
uniformity at retrieval, driving behavioral dependency. This same
mechanism has been used to account for retrieval generalization on
paired-associate tasks (e.g., where participants make inference
judgments about two overlapping associations; Banino et al.,
2016).
Our results do not rule out the possibility that interference (not
decay) is the primary driver of forgetting for event-based repre-
sentations, although this is at odds with recent theoretical and
empirical work (Sadeh et al., 2014, 2016). If so, interference would
need to be uniform in manner. For example, if you encoded two
events that share a common location; for example, “kitchen–
Obama–hammer” and “kitchen-Beckham-telephone,” the encod-
ing of the second event involving David Beckham would have to
interfere with not only retrieval success for the kitchen–Obama
and kitchen–hammer associations, but also the Obama–hammer
association—otherwise a decrease in dependency would likely be
seen. Though we cannot rule out an interference account, it is not
immediately clear how such uniformity could be achieved.
Although the precise mechanism that underlies the pattern of
forgetting seen in the present studies is unclear, the results (taken
alongside those of Brady et al. (2013)) suggest that forgetting for
event-based representations is driven by a different mechanism
than for item-based representations. We believe this is likely to be
hippocampal-based and supported by the known recurrent circuitry
in this region that has been shown to support the computational
process of pattern completion. Further, this is most likely a result
of decay, perhaps driven by neurogenesis of hippocampal granule
cells (Frankland et al., 2013), or more active regulatory changes
(Hardt et al., 2013). Note that the argument here is that forgetting
occurs due to a failure in pattern completion (Frankland et al.,
2013), rather than an erasure of memory per se. It is entirely
possible that aspects of some events, or entire events, can sponta-
neously recover and be brought to mind at some later point
(Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966), or could even be recovered via
optogenetic induction (Roy et al., 2016).
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Sleep and Mnemonic Integration
Sleep is thought to not only play an active role in the strength-
ening of memory traces, but also in the integration of overlapping
information (Lewis & Durrant, 2011; Stickgold & Walker, 2013).
For example, Lau et al. (2010) presented evidence for an increase
in participant’s ability to infer the relationship between A–C pairs
following a nap after directly encoding A–B and B–C pairs. This
increase in inference ability postnap was taken as evidence for
sleep playing an active role in the integration of A–B and B–C
pairs, similar to the evidence for integration seen during repeated
presentations of such pairs (Zeithamova et al., 2012). However, it
has recently been suggested that A–C inference can readily be
supported by retrieval-related processes, supported by the recur-
rent connections in the hippocampus (Kumaran & McClelland,
2012). Here, the relationship between A and C is generated “on-
the-fly,” via the retrieval of A–B and then B–C. Under this
account, the probability of successful inference increases via in-
creases in the associative strength of the directly encoded A–B and
B–C pairs.
Here we used retrieval dependency to distinguish between these
two accounts. In Experiment 1, participants learned open-loops
(A–B, B–C associative structures). After sleep, we tested retrieval
performance for the directly encoded pairs, and inference for the
A–C nonencoded pairs. Consistent with Lau et al. (2010), we
found evidence that sleep increased performance on an A–C in-
ference task (though the effect was relatively small). However, we
saw no increase in dependency as a function of sleep for open-
loops. We also saw no evidence for increases in dependency for
open-loops after a 1-week delay (Experiments 2 through 4), that
included multiple sleep–wake cycles. If sleep does play a role in
mnemonic inference, this effect is likely to be primarily driven by
increases in associative strength for directly encoded pairs that
allows for inference at the point of retrieval, rather than a more
active sleep-related integration process.
For both open- and closed-loops, sleep decreased forgetting
relative to wakefulness across a 12-hr delay (Experiment 1). Sleep
appears to decrease forgetting but does not change the form that
forgetting takes. This is consistent with existing models of con-
solidation (Frankland & Bontempi, 2005; McClelland et al., 1995;
Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Squire & Alvarez, 1995) where sleep
reduces forgetting by stabilizing existing connections between the
hippocampus and neocortex, perhaps counteracting memory decay
within the hippocampus (Frankland et al., 2013). However, this
process appears to occur without altering the form that forgetting
takes. Interestingly, we also showed that retrieval practice dimin-
ished the effect of sleep on memory (see the online supplemental
material), in line with the recent proposal that retrieval practice
might drive a rapid on-line consolidation process (Antony, Fer-
reira, Norman, & Wimber, 2017), mitigating the role of sleep
(Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011).
Closed-Loops as a Mnemonic Aid?
In Experiments 3 and 4, we saw greater retrieval accuracy for
closed- than open-loops, a difference that increased over time.
Indeed, after a week the difference in memory performance was
substantial (.16 in Experiment 3 and .13 in Experiment 4; com-
pared with .04 at T1 in Experiment 4). Thus, the associative
structure formed across separate encoding trials appears to signif-
icantly modulate the extent of forgetting over the course of a week.
This raises the possibility that learning associations between three
elements in a closed-loop structure might aid long-term retention
of such associations. Could associative structure at encoding be
used as an educational tool, similar in nature to known mnemonic
techniques such as retrieval practice (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006)
and the spacing effect (Ebbinghaus, 1913)?
This proposal would be premature, given the differences seen
between closed- and open-loops were only seen in Experiments 3
and 4. No difference in retrieval accuracy between closed- and
open-loops was seen after a week in Experiment 2. The key
difference between these experiments is the between- versus
within-subject experimental design. Whereas in Experiment 2 par-
ticipants either learned closed- or open-loops, in Experiments 3
and 4 participants learned both closed- and open-loops. Impor-
tantly, overall retrieval accuracy after a week (averaged across
closed- and open-loops) in Experiments 3 (.43) and 4 (.44) was
similar to Experiment 2 (.43). Thus, overall forgetting rates were
comparable, but learning both closed- and open-loop biased for-
getting such that open-loops were more likely to be forgotten than
closed-loops.
One possible explanation for this effect is a competitive model
of forgetting, where multiple associative structures compete for
survival. Closed-loops are already associated with significantly
higher retrieval accuracy at immediate test (though the numerical
size of the effect is relatively small). If this higher retrieval
accuracy relates to greater associative strength, then perhaps this
allows closed-loops to “out-compete” open-loops to survive. An-
other possibility is that the coherent nature of closed-loops, that
allows for pattern completion at retrieval, increases the probability
that such representations are replayed during offline consolidation
processes (Lewis & Durrant, 2011), increasing retrieval accuracy
relative to those nonreplayed representations (i.e., open-loops).
Note that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Impor-
tantly, Poulton (1982) has argued that within-subject designs, in
contrast to between-subjects designs, can bias performance (in
unknown ways) due to asymmetries in encoding and/or retrieval
strategies when conditions are interleaved randomly. Accordingly,
the difference in retrieval accuracy between closed- and open-
loops observed here could be due to the transfer of a particular
strategy that is appropriate in one condition, but not in the other.
Further work is needed to determine the precise experimental
conditions under which closed-loops are more likely to be retained.
However, if one accepts that some amount of forgetting is inevi-
table in any educational setting, learning a certain amount of
information in a ‘closed-loop’ format might promote long-term
retention of important information. Critically, if such a technique
were to be used as an educational ‘tool’ to increase long-term
retention, similar effects would need to be shown in developmental
populations, given the protracted development of the hippocampus
in childhood (Olson & Newcombe, 2013).
Conclusion
Across four experiments, we provide consistent evidence that
retrieval dependency does not change over time, despite variation
in the overall amount of forgetting: The associative structure
formed at encoding has a consistent, lasting, impact on the coher-
ency of retrieval. In relation to closed-loops, the results support our
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hypothesis that coherent event representations tend to be forgotten
in an all-or-none manner, such that events are more likely to be
either forgotten or retained in their entirety. Consistent with this,
we provide evidence against the notion that coherent event repre-
sentations fragment as a function of forgetting by the creation of an
independent model of forgetting (as opposed to the independent
model of retrieval used in previous studies (Horner & Burgess,
2013, 2014). We also saw evidence that the associative structure at
encoding can, under specific conditions, modulate the overall
amount of forgetting. When participants learned closed- and open-
loops, forgetting rates were significantly lower for closed-loops
(this was not the case when participants learned either closed-loops
or open-loops). Thus, we also provide evidence that retrieval
accuracy and dependency can be modulated by the associative
structure at encoding.
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